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INTRODUCTION
The world press for many years, has made references to con-
tracts being awarded to international consortia, particularly for
large infrastructure projects in lesser developed countries. 1 This
Article will explore in Part I what an international consortium is,
offering a definition which establishes the consortium agreement as
the essence of the consortium. Part II explains the reasons for
using a consortium in large projects, and Part III offers some prac-
tical advice in the formation of a consortium agreement.
I. WHAT IS AN INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM?
A. A New Definition
A consortium has been defined as "an association of two or
more business entities of different nationalities temporarily joined
together for the performance of a limited task . . . ,"2 and as "an
ad hoc or ongoing, informal or formal, sometimes 'shell', associa-
* Member of the New York Bar. B.S.F.S. 1959, Georgetown University; J.D.
1962, Harvard University. Mr. Milton is presently an attorney for Northrop Corpora-
tion.
1. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1978, at 10, col. 3 (hydroelectric complex in
Paraguay); id. Feb. 16, 1977, at 4, col. 1 (petro-chemical complex in Saudi Arabia).
2. Hannon, Use of an International Consortium in a Major International Pro-
jcct, in 1970 PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 103, 105.
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tion of two or more business/governmental/financial entities to prof-
itably pursue, generally on a competitive basis, one or more com-
mon commercial activities .... "3 These definitions suffer from not
making clear how the word "association" is being used. As there
are different forms a consortium may take, 4 an "association" could
be mistaken for any of them.
It should be clear that the consortium itself is not an entity,
but a contractual relationship between the consortium members.
This relationship is separate and distinct from the form the consor-
tium may adopt. To avoid any definitional confusion between the
contractual relationship of the consortium members and the form of
the consortium the word "form" should not be included in the defi-
nition of a consortium, as in "a form of cooperation between two or
more parties for the purpose of meeting a customer's requirements
for a specific project.'5
Another problem with all the aforementioned definitions is their
general character, such that they are applicable to more than
just consortia. A proper definition of consortium should include the
central concern of contracts entered into between the companies
forming a modern consortium; namely, "obtaining and executing,
jointly and severally, a contract for the supply of goods and ser-
vices." 6 Taking this fact, and bearing in mind that the relationship
between the consortium members is contractual, the following new
and comprehensive definition of a modern international consortium
emerges: a temporary contractual relationship of two or more busi-
ness entities of different nationalities, formed for the purpose of
executing, jointly and severally, a specific contract, usually in-
volving complex civil engineering, 7 for the supply of goods and/or
services.
3. C. DHAWAN & L. KRYZANOWSKI, EXPORT CONSORTIA: A CANADIAN STUDY
9-10 (1978).
4. Consortia have typically taken one of four forms: common approach, common
agency, partnership and corporation. A. BOULTON, BUSINESS CONSORTIA 41 (1961). A
recent consortium form, endowed with its own legal characteristics, and particularly
suited for transnational cooperation, is the French Groupment d'Int6r~t Economique.
See Bott & Rosener, The Groupment d'Intgrt Economique, 1970 J. Bus. L. 313.
5. Guide for Drawing Up an International Consortium Agreement 5 (1976) (a
study of the working group "Legal Affairs" of ORGALIME) [hereinafter cited as
Guide].
6. M. MERCADAL & M. JANIN, LES CONTRATS DE COOPPRATION INTER-
ENTERPRISES 941 (1974) [unofficial translation].
7. Id. Typically, a consortium will be involved in large infrastructure projects,
e.g., a power generating plant.
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All the members of the consortium are jointly and severally li-
able for the performance of a contract entered into by the consor-
tium. 8 There is, however, no fiduciary relationship between the
members. Without a specific clause in the consortium agreement
creating a fiduciary relationship, none exists.
B. What a Consortium is not
In the following discussion, consortia will be distinguished
from unincorporated associations, partnerships and joint ventures.
It should not be presumed that a consortium is any one of these
entities, as the relationship between the consortium members is a
contractual one embodied in the consortium agreement. In the ab-
sence of any agreement as to form, the duties and liabilities of the
consortium members are to be determined by looking at the con-
sortium agreement.
Under the concept of an unincorporated association, if an "as-
sociation is formed for conducting business for the purpose of
profit, it is a partnership and the liability of the individual mem-
bers incurred or contracts made on behalf of the association by offi-
cers or individual members is governed by the law of partner-
ship." 9 As the relationship between the members of the consortium
is purely contractual, there is no a priori intention to adopt the fi-
duciary impositions of partnership.
It is necessary to recall some of the distinguishing features of
joint ventures as opposed to partnerships. In turn, it can be seen
how consortia differ from both partnerships and joint ventures.
Usually, the parties to a joint venture form a corporate entity
whereby all the relations between the parties are embodied in the
charter, by-laws and related documents. However, this entity is
8. An attempt to limit liability by the formation of a consortium corporation
usually will be resisted by the customer, for the obivous reason that the customer
wants to have all the assets of the member companies subject to judgment in the
event of a breach of contract. Further, two or more companies from different nations
generally find it difficult to create a corporation for the sole purpose of completing an
industrial project. This is because their native corporation laws usually will differ,
and each will be reluctant to accept the corporate laws of another country. Also,
management of each company will have to face the problem of whether ownership of
an interest in a consortium corporation will create any undue tax liability which will
cause an increase in the contingency pricing to the customer.
9. 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 307, at 435-37 (3d ed. 1959).
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not required in order that there be a joint venture. What is re-
quired is a group of companies, individuals, or both, with all the
following characteristics:
(1) Contribution by the different parties of money, property, ef-
fort, knowledge, skill or some other asset to a common un-
dertaking;
(2) Joint property interest in the subject matter of the venture;
(3) Right of mutual control or management of the enterprise;
(4) An expectation of profit;
(5) A right to participate in the profits;
(6) A limitation of the objective to a single understanding. 10
The courts, in many cases, have seized upon the single under-
taking characteristic of the joint venture to distinguish it from a
partnership." If a profit-making association is to continue for a
series of commercial or professional transactions, the partnership
relation is deemed to be intended. 12 International consortia, like
joint ventures, exist for a single undertaking, thereby being distin-
guished from partnerships. Further, the members of a consor-
tium do not undertake any fiduciary duty toward each other,
which is a characteristic of partnership, 13 unless contracted into the
consortium agreement.
A consortium also is distinguished from a joint venture in
that the consortium lacks two very important characteristics of the
joint venture: (1) a joint property interest in the subject matter of
the venture, and (2) a right to participate or share in the profits.
In the usual project consortium each party contributes and re-
tains ownership of those elements of property required for the par-
ticular project, other than the equipment to be supplied to the cus-
10. Id. § 318A, at 563-65.
11. See Matanuska Valley Bank v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 1955)
("[P]artnership agreement ... for a single purpose establishes the association of the
parties as a joint venture."); cf. Clark v. Sidway, 142 U.S. 682 (1891) (joint purchase
of land does not constitute a partnership when the purchase was a single, special ad-
venture). See generally 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 318B, at 593-95. Other char-
acteristics which distinguish joint ventures from partnerships are: (1) the eligibility
of corporations for membership, (2) the absence or extreme limitation of the agency
relationship, (3) the sharing of losses as not being essential, (4) the ability of ventur-
ers to bring an action at law on the agreement as opposed to the restriction of part-
ners to suits in equity, (5) that a partnership is an entity while a joint venture may or
may not be an entity. Id. at 592.
12. See 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 318A, at 563-65.
13. See generally 1 BOWLEY ON PARTNERSHIP ch. 21 (2d ed. 1960).
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tomer. In the vast majority of cases this property consists of
construction aids which are, and continue to be, the property of
the general contractor.
A far more important distinction between a consortium and a
joint venture is that in a consortium there is no right to share in
profits. Each party's profit results from its participation in the con-
sortium. Profit calculations are made without reference to the cal-
culations of other members. The only concern is that other mem-
bers may take, or fail to take, actions which could endanger
expected profits.14
II. WHY A CONSORTIUM?
A number of reasons have been advanced for the formation of
consortia. Often cited is a desire on the part of the consortium
members to share the risks of a particular project.' 5 Assume three
companies, A, B and C, all of equal technical and financial
strength, contemplate a project in which each will supply one-third
of the required goods or services. Further assume that company A
can take on the job as a prime contractor, be a member of a con-
sortium, or be a subcontractor to either or both of the other two
companies. If company A is a prime contractor, it will be legally
responsible for the total risk of the entire project. By properly
drawn subcontracts, however, it may "lay-off" two-thirds of that
risk except for those contingencies caused by inevitable gaps in
scope of the subcontracts, i.e., the prime contractor will have to
supply those items of material or services which are not specifically
delineated in the subcontracts.
If company A becomes a member of a consortium for the same
project, joint and several liability for the entire project will be at-
tributed to it, as well as its fellow members. A properly drawn con-
sortium agreement, however, would call for a proportionate sharing
of the costs of any items not anticipated when each of the com-
panies delineated its scope of supply.
If company A becomes a subcontractor, it has legal risk only
for its own scope of supply, which is delineated in its subcontract.
14. This does not mean that a consortium member has the freedom to act in all
situations without regard to the interests of the other members. See Judgement of
Oct. 30, 1969, Cour de Cassation, Cass. civ. 3 e, Fr., [1969] Bull. Civ. III 530 (where
the French court did not allow the leader of a consortium to keep for itself the pro-
ceeds of a successful renegotiation with a customer).
15. A. BOULTON, supra note 4, at 16.
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From the point of view of risk sharing, this is the best situation for
company A.
Thus far, the only advantage to company A in forming a consor-
tium is the sharing of the risk of unanticipated gaps in the scope of
supply. That benefit may be outweighed by a consideration of the
tremendous effort required to negotiate, consummate and imple-
ment a consortium agreement. In other words, company A may
find it more beneficial to add a contingency amount to its price and
treat the other companies as subcontractors.
Notice what happens if the facts of the hypothetical are varied.
Assume that company C is not as strong, financially or technically,
as the other companies. If company A is prime, it has an additional
risk of having to cover the obligations of company C if that com-
pany defaults in any manner. If, however, company A can form a
consortium with company B, then it can truly be said that it has
shared the risk of company C's possible failure of performance.
Strangely enough, if company C were weak, comapnyA's position
as a subcontractor may be worse than if company C were strong.
Most prime contractors try to negotiate some form of pari passu
payment arrangement with their major subcontractors. Default by
company C might cause the customer to slow down or cease mak-
ing payments to company B, the prime contractor, which, under a
pari passu arrangement, means that company A would suffer.
Thus, it is clear that consortia have value as a risk-sharing de-
vice only if one of the members is financially or technically weak.
In that case, the other members are arranging in advance for pro-
portional contribution to the cost of making good a potential
default.
Another reason for the formation of consortia is the need to
combine the technical expertise of several concerns in order to re-
alize a large, complex project. 16 An atomic power plant or a com-
plex petro-chemical facility may be beyond the technical capability
of any one company. In such a situation, an association of com-
panies, each known for its expertise in different areas of a project,
can give the particular group a definite competitive advantage in
any evaluation by the customer. 17
Additionally, consortia are formed due to the sheer size of the
project from a financial point of view.' 8 Some companies lack the
16. Id. at 20; M. MERCADAL & M. JANIN, supra note 6 at 943.
17. A. BOULTON, supra note 4, at 106.
18. M. MERCADAL & M. JANIN, supra note 6, at 943.
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resources to provide the working capital required for a multi-
million, or even billion, dollar project. Examples of such projects
are the large power generation and desalinization projects in Saudi
Arabia, which require enormous capital commitments.
There are also political reasons. In certain countries local con-
tractors and suppliers are clearly favored as a matter of government
policy. 19 Associating with such entities in a consortium gives the
foreign members a competitive advantage in any evaluation.
Finally, in some countries, particularly those with a value-
added or "turnover" tax system,20 there may be a tax or fiscal ad-
vantage to the formation of a consortium. To the extent that the
proposal must include all such taxes, i.e., that they are for the ac-
count of the contractor and not reimburseable, such additional
costs can be reduced or eliminated by placing all major suppliers
on the same tier by means of a consortium.
III. THE CONSORTIUM AGREEMENT
It should be clear at the outset that there is no universal
model or standard form of consortium agreement. Indeed, the one
well developed monograph on the subject2l disregarded this ap-
proach in favor of the creation of a check list of issues for settle-
ment between prospective members, followed by the presentation
of a Specimen Agreement as an example of a "work-out" of some of
the items discussed under the check list.2 2 In the spirit of that ap-
19. Id.
20. In a "turnover" tax jurisdiction it is extremely important for a consortium to
avoid an entity form, as normally only one level of exoneration from turnover taxes is
available. Further, the companies forming the consortium would then be treated as
subcontractors to it.
21. Guide, supra note 5.
22. Id. at 6-7. The check list covers the following areas:
(1) Parties, Object, Form and Duration;
(2) Law of the Contract and Settlement of Disputes;
(3) Internal Organization;
(4) Management of the Project;
(5) Tendering;
(6) Division of Work among Members;
(7) Members Obligation to each other;
(8) Financial Considerations;
(9) Liabilities;
(10) Retirement from the Consortium Agreement.
The author has reservations about the check list approach. A number of years
of practice in the field have convinced him that the difficulties among members
of consortia are all too often caused by a failure to consider a well-drafted pro-
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proach, this section of the Article will deal only with some of the
more important areas which should be covered in a consortium
agreement.
A. Parties to the Consortium
Care should be taken to provide in the consortium agreement
for the possible admission or withdrawal of consortium members
before, as well as after, the execution of the contract with the cus-
tomer. In the event of an admission of a new member to the con-
sortium, unanimity should be required as the original members
usually will be jointly and severally liable for the performance of
the new member.23
The take-over of one of the members by another company out-
side the original group is a possibility which has led to the follow-
ing recommendation:
The agreement should ... provide that in the event of a constit-
uent coming under the control of any other corporation it
should, if called upon so to do by any other constituent, with-
draw from the consortium and transfer its share to any person or
company nominated by the other constituents. The reason for
this is that co-operation in a consortium involves the sharing of a
posed form of consortium agreement which has been prepared and presented well in
advance of the negotiation of the contract between the consortium and the potential
customer. This merely encourages delay in consideration of vital issues. On the other
hand, presentation of a model agreement (if a specific consortium agreement cannot
be drafted for the particular project) has the exact opposite tendency-it forces other
members to consider the aforementioned vital issues in fear that the creator of the
original draft may be trying to take advantage of those potential members who have
been focusing all their attention on obtaining the ultimate contract with the
customer.
One can simplify the legal relationship to some degree and put the other mem-
bers on appropriate notice by adopting a technique which has been used rather suc-
cessfully in a limited number of cases. This is to draft a short letter of intent to form
a consortium, usually called a "Memorandum of Association," and attach to it a pro-
posed form of consortium agreement. Such documents are normally two or three
pages long and do little more than indicate the project, the intent of the parties to
engage in a consortium to seek a contract for the realization of the project, and their
respective scopes of work and an intention to negotiate their relations generally
along the lines set forth in the proposed draft. Besides crystallizing attention of the
provisions of the draft form of consortium agreement, such a memorandum indicates
at least a moral commitment to work together. However, it is common for European
companies to attempt to convert the moral commitment into a legal covenant by in-
serting a provision that the parties will not attempt in any other fashion, or with any
other partners, to achieve a contract for the project.
23. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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great deal of confidential information, not only in the matter of
technical data, prices and the like, but also in the more subtle
insight into mental attitudes and methods of doing business that
comes from working together. The possibility of take-over bids
must be kept in mind. Take-over can make the once-inde-
pendent company into the puppet of a competitor, can overnight
change a friend and collaborator into an object of distrust. 24
In the event the prospective members of the consortium de-
sire to operate as a consortium corporation, restrictions should be
placed on the possibility of a voluntary transfer of shares as "a con-
sortium is an organization whose success generally requires that
members have a high degree of confidence in one another ... "25
If, however, a voluntary transfer of interests is agreed upon, the
consortium agreement should then:
either freely permit a transfer of an interest resulting from a
merger, a consolidation, or a sale of substantially all the assets of
a consortium member, or it should permit the resignation of the
member from the consortium in such event. With today's busi-
ness climate here and abroad characterized by frequent corpo-
rate reorganizations, few consortium members can afford to put
themselves in a position in which a major corporate reorganiza-
tion could constitute a transfer of an interest in the consortium,
giving the other consortium members (who are sometimes a
member's business competitors) a right to withhold consent to
such reorganization.2 6
It is suggested that no clause be inserted in the consortium
agreement prohibiting separate tenders by consortium members.
The reason for this is that the:
formation of a consortium is never the only way and sometimes
not even the best way to handle a complex project, and many
companies would feel more attracted to supplying their contribu-
tion to such a project as specialist sub-contractors than as mem-
bers of a consortium in which they will have the responsibility of
sharing in administrative control and in answering for the com-
pleteness, the overall adequacy and technical functioning of the
complete installation. 27
24. A. BOULTON, supra note 4, at 72.
25. Hannon, supra note 2, at 124.
26. Id. at 124-25.
27. Id. at 54-55.
If the company concerned is a specialist manufacturer producing prod-
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These business reasons against the insertion of an anti-tender
clause are supported by antitrust considerations, which argue against
anything but a qualified restriction on the freedom of the mem-
bers to bid in competition with the proposal. 28
B. The Consortium Leader
A consortium is commonly led, as well as represented in nego-
tiations with the customer, by a Consortium Leader or Chef de
File. This position calls for careful definition in the consortium
agreement.
The primary function of the Consortium Leader is to
coordinate the work between the consortium members, while also
serving as an intermediary between the customer and the mem-
bers. Coordinating the work of members prior to signature of the
contracts means reviewing each member's part of the proposal to
insure that it is complete, and then reducing all members' parts to
a unified, internally logical and consistent whole.
This question of division of work causes more problems in
modern consortia, particularly those involving members from dif-
ferent countries, than any other. This is due to an inadequate defi-
nition of where one member's scope ends and another's begins.
Vague phrases such as "supply all construction materials," or "pro-
vide all equipment needed for," should be avoided in any consor-
tium agreement. Good practice indicates that annexes listing the
exact scope of each member, in the maximum degree detail possi-
ble, be prepared prior to the conclusion of either the consortium
agreement or the final contract with the customer. At this stage,
ucts which either by reason of patent protection or specialised technical
qualities cannot be matched by other manufacturers, an attitude of exclu-
siveness, by which it refuses to tender to a competing organisation, will ob-
viously give great strength to the consortium. It may however earn severe
criticism, since such a manufacturer, as a matter of prestige, usually attempts
to present the appearance of scrupulously fair dealing with all.
id.
28. International consortia are subject to antitrust laws. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977) (Case C). See B. HAWK,
UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARA-
TIVE GUIDE 296-99 (1979). For this reason the author has resisted calls by members
for exclusivity. Instead he has recommended: (1) requiring disclosure to all consor-
tium members by the member who will bid in another fashion, (2) a commitment
that no member will offer more favorable prices, conditions or delivery terms to out-
siders than it offers to the consortium, and (3) a prohibition against disclosure of all
intra-consortium information to outsiders.
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differences in opinion as to proper scope can be adjusted rather
easily, pricing can be modified in accordance with the resulting al-
location, and unwarranted, possibly duplicative, contingencies can
be eliminated, to the commercial enhancement of the project.
Conversely, such preparation also will reveal omissions in coverage
which can require either an upward adjustment of the total price
or, if that is no longer possible, a review by the members of their
collective desire to continue with the project.
If the Consortium Leader will be negotiating on behalf of his
fellows, 29 the consortium agreement must come to grips with what
limits should be put on the Leader and how they should be de-
fined. This problem can be divided into price and other terms of
the principal contract. As to the former, there should be a clear
understanding that there can be no reduction or increase in price
without the prior consent of all consortium members. As to the lat-
ter, there is a significant practical distinction between businessmen
from common law countries and businessmen from codified civil
law countries.
Civil law countries tend to have less complex contracts, as
the principles of the Code set outside limits to contracting powers,
and establish a frame against which all contracting must take place.
This, in turn, creates an attitude on the part of such businessmen
with respect to delegation of negotiating authority to the Consor-
tium Leader. They are much more apt to grant broad powers to
the Consortium Leader than representatives of companies from
common law countries, who do not have any codes to protect them
in negotiating construction contracts. Only with respect to "finan-
cial" questions, such as price, terms of payment and the rate and
amount of liquidated damages, are civil law-oriented businessmen
likely to insist on a right of review. This facilitates drafting the
clause setting the limits of the power of the Consortium Leader.
When businessmen and their lawyers from common law coun-
tries contemplate broad delegations of power to negotiate every-
thing but "financial" terms, they tend to react with unease, if not
horror, as they are accustomed to more detailed contracts and
tend to feel that they must carefully consider the potential impact
of every clause of a contract.
The solution is to make a common law representative the
29. In some countries it is not uncommon for the consortium members to be
told that a customer will only negotiate with the Consortium Leader.
1980]
132 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM [Vol. 3:121
Leader in all contract negotiations, and impose the "financial" limi-
tations upon it. If that is not possible, and a representative of a
civil law country becomes Leader, then the representatives from
the common law countries should carefully consider a limited list"0
of clauses, other than "financial" ones, as to which they insist on a
right of review and this list should be embodied in the memoran-
dum of association or the consortium agreement.
C. Management of the Project
The problem of how to manage the project, after the consor-
tium has signed the principal contract, breaks down into two sepa-
rate questions: (1) how is the project to be managed from the point
of view of overall policy? and (2) how is the day-to-day work in the
field to be directed? There have been two traditional solutions to
the problem. One is management by committee; 31 the other is
30. The list must be limited as it would be impractical for each member to
review all the terms of the principal contract.
31. Members' meetings [i.e., meetings of the Management] committee
should be regarded as the Executive or Plenary meeting of the Consortium,
at which all Members should be present before the meeting is valid (i.e. the
quorum is 100%). Full attendance is suggested as a sine qua non because
the Members' meeting is the only evidence of the collective personality of
the Consortium and is the only body with plenary powers capable of making
executive decisions. It is obvious that the absence of any member of the
Consortium from such a meeting might prove fatal to any decision taken. On
the other hand the establishment of the quorum at less than 100% might be
the means of preventing the blocking of decisions by a self-interested minor-
ity. It might be advisable to provide that if a quorum is not present at the
time and place notified for a Members' meeting, the meeting shall stand ad-
journed for a specific period and at the postponed meeting the business
shall be transacted whatever the number of Members present. It will be
necessary to include in the agreement proper regulations to cover the proce-
dure at meetings, voting and the competence of the meetings, and a time
limit for approval of the minutes of Members' meetings. A particular point to
be borne in mind would be the definition of the Project Manager's [i.e., Con-
sortium Leader's] rights (if any) at a Members' meeting. Arrangements for the
convening of Members' meetings should be settled, e.g. periods of notice,
frequency of meetings, notice by post, telex, etc. together with who has author-
ity to convene such meetings and for the taking and-approval of minutes.
As regards competence, it would be convenient to reserve all questions
of policy to the Members' meeting and to take care to lay down what part
the Project Manager may take in Members' meetings. If technical or com-
mercial committees are required their responsibilities and powers should be
carefully defined.
It would be necessary to lay down whether or not all decisions of the
Members or committees require a unanimous vote and if not, what is the
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delegating all questions of policy and management, except those
specifically reserved in the consortium agreement, to one
company.3 2
majority required to authorise a decision.
The number of votes as between Members should be laid down.
Guide, supra note 5, at 9 (emphasis added).
This statement is quoted at length, first because the author disagrees with this
technique for the reason that the very attempt to build an agreement on all the
points mentioned will often cause the legal edifice to come crashing down and, sec-
ond, because he does not think this truly reflects the actual practice of consortia
which are managed by a committee. In practice, if the consortium is operating suc-
cessfully, all of the formalities described tend to be ignored; if it is unsuccessful (and
generally this means that one but not all of the companies is not successful-usually
the construction company), then these formalities become a means for one or more
companies to obtain relief from the other members.
Another problem with the description of management by committee is the defi-
nition of the word "policy." Obviously, not all companies think the same questions
are matters of policy. What is not so obvious, but just as valid, is that what is a matter
of policy for one consortium grouping may not always be a matter of policy for an-
other. The difficulties in defining policy are illustrated by the following example.
Suppose one member is asked by the customer to perform some highly profitable ex-
tra work, and that performance of such work will delay acceptance of the project and
the consequent release of the moneys due upon provisional acceptance, for a period
of several months. As all members would share in these moneys, the remaining
members may complain bitterly about the delay in receipt of their share. Yet the au-
thor doubts than any consortium agreement has ever defined the acceptance of extra
work orders as a matter of policy to be decided by a management committee.
32. An alternative to management by committee is the practice found, particu-
larly in less complex projects, of delegating all managerial powers to one company,
or even to one individual. There are different ways of resolving the question of
choice of manager:
First, one of the Members of the Consortium can be appointed Project Man-
ager to deal with the Customer and all aspects of the project. In this case
management may be performed by one or more of that Members' employees.
Secondly, the Members may wish to appoint an independent person, e.g. a
Consulting Engineer, who would be appointed under a separate agreement
with the Consortium. That agreement will need to provide that in matters of
policy he is subject to the direction of the Members' meetings.
Thirdly, the Project Manager could be an employee of the Consortium itself
with all the employment problems that that entails.
The fourth possibility is that an employee of one of the Members be ap-
pointed Project Manager, in which case it is likely that his role will be pri-
marily an executive one subordinated to the Members' meeting. This solu-
tion is similar to the third but should avoid the problem of the Consortium
being the employer. It has the disadvantage of the possibility of divided
loyalties.
Guide, supra note 5 at 9.
The first of the four choices described really involved the choice of a company as
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Another technique of project management that has proven
quite useful in recent years has been that of distinguishing be-
tween overall project management and management in the field.
This offers greater efficiency and flexibility in many areas, and is
generally most effective in construction projects in lesser devel-
oped countries. Under this concept, one company, usually the ma-
jor equipment manufacturer, is designated Consortium Leader
with total responsibility for overall management, including
scheduling of equipment deliveries and procurement of any addi-
tional services that might be required outside of the country in
which the project is to be constructed. Inside the country, another
member of the consortium (or an independent company), known as
the Field Project Manager, 33 is responsible for management at the
site, as well as procurement of all local material and services.
Liaison with the customer can be handled at the executive
level by the Consortium Leader, and at the site by the Field Pro-
ject Manager. When, as occasionally happens, a customer insists on
dealing only with representatives of the Consortium Leader, the
difficulty is met by attaching to the staff of the Field Project Mana-
ger an individual as consortium representative with the customer.
Whatever method of management is used, it should be obvi-
ous that the powers of those responsible must be clearly defined in
the consortium agreement.
D. Liabilities
The basic liabilities facing a project-oriented consortium are of
two types: (1) those for defects in the performance or quality of the
Consortium Leader and presents the same problems with respect to loyalty that the
fourth method poses. This question of divided loyalty is further complicated by the
practice, which is not at all uncommon in consortia with European members, of the
payment of a fee to the Consortium Leader for its services. It is suggested that the
imposition of such a fee might, under American law, raise a question as to whether
the Consortium Leader has become an agent for hire by the other members and,
thus, a fiduciary in its relations to them under the normal principles of Agency law.
For this reason, the author has always recommended against this practice. Absent
such a fee, it seems that the Consortium Leader owes no special duty beyond that of
ordinary commercial good faith to his fellow members.
33. With respect to the Field Project Manager, there is the possible problem
that progress in the field is being achieved by methods which, if discovered, could
bring opprobrium to the entire group, thus endangering the future market potential
in the host country. The publicity resulting from identification with a briber of offi-
cials in the host country is something most American companies would prefer to
avoid. There are, in addition to publicity, possible sanctions under the provisions of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)-(2) (Supp. 1 1977).
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project, and (2) those for delay in completion of the project. 34 The
first type of liability is a consequence of "poor performance," i.e.,
performance which does not meet the contractual guarantees of the
equipment supplied. The second type originates in the failure of
one or more of the consortium members to meet the commitments
of the original schedule.
It would seem natural for the consortium agreement to contain
a clause to the effect that the party responsible for the imposition
of any liquidated damages is liable for their payment. This, how-
ever, ignores two important facts. First, the potential exposure to
the consortium may be much greater than any one company nor-
mally calculates as its own share of a reasonable contingency for
defect or delay in performance. Second, it is often times impossible
to assign fault to any single individual member. Therefore, consor-
tium members will seek a formula to determine how liability for
fault will be assessed.
Initially, it may seem appropriate to calculate the percentage
of liability based on the relative amounts of profit that each of the
consortium members anticipates from the job. Experience dictates,
however, that many companies are extremely reluctant to disclose
profit margins. Also, differences in calculating profits from com-
pany to company and from country to country, as well as the desire
of each company to insure that such information remains "in house"
and not subject to disclosure to competitors, makes the usage of
formulas based on profit margins very difficult.
The best solution seems to be the so-called "rough justice" ap-
proach. 35 To begin any calculation of interests, exposure to liabili-
ties and the like, the expected gross receipts of each consortium
member is used as the basis. 36
In the unusual situation of a defaulting member who is clearly
at fault, but cannot bear the imposition of the entire amount of liq-
uidated damages, then:
provide in the consortium agreement that the guilty member
will bear the first slice of liquidated damages, but that damages
in excess of a stated amount or stated percentage of the value of
his supplies or of the total contract value will be shared pro rata
among the other members. 37
34. Clarke, Contingent Liability in Consortium Arrangements, 120 SOLICI-
TORS' J. 240 (1976).
35. Hannon, supra note 2, at 122.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 242.
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This may seem unfair to the other members, but such an ap-
proach significantly reduces the risk that the defaulting member
will find the threatened penalty so great that it will opt, or be
forced, to declare bankruptcy which will then throw the initial bur-
den of the payment of the entire amount of the liquidated damages
owed to the buyer of the project back on the remaining members
of the consortium. Of course, all the members could seek mutual
protection at the time of creation of the initial consortium by de-
manding guarantees of parent companies, or requiring insurance
company bonds, or bank guarantees from each member, 38 but a de-
gree of prudence in estimating the sum required must be exer-
cised, as the cost of such financial gurantees will have to be in-
cluded in the price to the customer.
E. Financing
Most large infrastructure projects in the world today require
that the companies bidding on such project arrange for some type
of long term financing of the project. As long as the bidders are all
from one country, this is a relatively simple problem. The problem
becomes serious when a consortium of companies from two or
more countries seeks to arrange such financing. The various banks
involved have significant differences as to terms, interest rates,
grace periods and formalities. 39 This makes the preparation
of the financing package extremely complicated, and may penal-
ize the more complex international consortia if they must prove
the competitiveness of their proposal, with its several varieties of
repayment terms, against the single offer from companies coming
from one country with one financial package. It is contended that
this is a major reason why many large projects in recent years have
been bid by "national" consortia, i.e., those coming from one coun-
try, rather than "international" consortia. The latter combination
may be able to put together a package of currencies which is
cheaper to the ultimate customer when measured against an abso-
lute standard of any one currency, but many customers prefer not
to make such evaluations, feeling that the paperwork complexities
and difficulties in making currency evaluations for budgetary pur-
poses are so great that they outweigh any apparent financial loss.
38. This discussion assumes that no single source project financing by an
agency such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the
World Bank) is available to the host nation for the project.
39. Id. For a general discussion of multi-source international project financing,
see 1975 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE
(J. Sweeney ed. 1976).
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F. Payment
Even if the parties to the consortium agreement are able to
acquire financing, they are then confronted with the problem of
reconciling the terms of payment offered by the bank(s) with that
of the potential customer in the project contract. Here the inter-
ests of the usually asset-rich equipment manufacturer and those of
the usually thinly capitalized construction company may diverge
rather sharply. The manufacturer, while he would like to recover
all his costs in advance, usually is more willing to waive the bene-
fits of such a demand than a construction company which must
conserve its working capital at all times.
The problem is made more difficult if a specialist type of con-
tractor is involved in the project, and is not prepared to wait for
payment until the consortium is paid. If this entity provides ser-
vices that are unique and thus is able to insist on its own terms, its
demands can- be met by either of the following two alternatives:
[F]irst .. .to arrange for one of the constituents to take respon-
sibility by accepting the non-member as a sub-contractor, and to
be remunerated for bearing the responsibility of furnishing the
temporary capital required by being permitted to take a mar-
ginal profit on the transaction.
[S]econd ...for the consortium to draw upon the constituents
by way of loan to bridge the gap in time between the payment
to the non-member supplier and the receipt of funds from the
customer.4 0
Another problem arises from the refusal of companies to ac-
cept the payment terms or procedures of the customer without the
other members' assurance that they will be indemnified in some
manner if the customer fails to insure payment within a stipulated
period of time. A clause in the consortium agreement giving a
member either the right to suspend work or the right to receive
advances from the other members of the group, if invoices are not
approved and paid within a stipulated period of time, is vital to any
company weak in working capital. Of course, all the members
should seek either a right of suspension or the right to charge in-
terest on delayed payment if the same period of time passes and
the customer has not acted so as to insure payment within that pe-
40. Boulton, Finance in the "Single Project" Consortium, 1961 J. Bus. L. 368,
371-72.
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riod. Still, interest to a thinly capitalized company is only margin-
ally helpful; it is better for such a company to forego the interest in
favor of reimbursement from the other members. The "remunera-
tion" to the other members making the advances is the share of in-
terest on the delayed payment which would have gone to the
member which insisted on indemnification.
G. Procedure for Invoicing and Payment
A related element of a properly drawn consortium agreement,
which is sometimes overlooked or treated somewhat superficially, is
the procedure for invoicing and payment.
The method of invoicing and payment will almost certainly be
laid down in the main contract. Within the Consortium it is nor-
mal for each Member to send invoices to the Project Manager
who will collate them and, after adding an appropriate part of his
fee and the common expenses, provide a separate invoice to the
Customer in the name of the Consortium or in his own name.
The method of invoicing chosen may be affected by the fiscal
laws in the Members' or Customer's countries, or by the respec-
tive laws of the Consortium agreement or main contract. 41
Additionally, there are the following considerations. First, bill-
ing in the name of the consortium should be avoided in any juris-
diction where, for tax reasons, it is desirable to avoid giving the ap-
pearance that an entity has been created. 42 For this reason, the
separate invoices should be merely collated and transmitted in
such a jurisdiction. Of course, besides separate billing, each mem-
ber should keep a separate set of books.
Second, the parties may find it more convenient to divide the
invoicing procedure in two, and have one locus for the preparation
of invoices for that portion of a project to be paid in foreign ex-
change, and another for the portion of the price which is payable
in the local currency. Normally, the formalities for the approval
and payment of invoices denominated in a foreign currency are
much more complex than those calling for payment in the local
currency; the former often requiring the approval, or review, of a
separate central bank or ministry of finance.
It is also often convenient to have the office of the Field Pro-
41. Guide, supra note 5, at 13.
42. See note 20 supra.
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ject Manager, rather than the staff of the Consortium Leader, pre-
pare and present the invoices in the local currency. Where billing
is on a "percentage of progress completed" basis, arguments over
the amount of work done can usually be settled or compromised by
the Field Project Manager and his counterpart on the staff of the
customer. Also, payment of invoices may be pursued more effec-
tively by the staff of the Field Project Manager on the scene
which, hopefully, will be able to establish a good rapport with the
financial staff of the customer.
Third, care should be taken to insure that setting out a sepa-
rate charge for the services of the Consortium Leader is acceptable
to the customer, as in some countries such a fee would have to be
"buried" in a breakdown of the prices for equipment and services.
H. Expenses of Consortium Members
While it is understood that each consortium member supplies
its own working capital and pays its own expenses once the con-
tract for the project has been obtained, the memorandum of associ-
ation and consortium agreement should pay particular attention to
the following questions. (1) How are the costs of preparing and
negotiating the proposal to be allocated, particularly in the event
the consortium is unsuccessful in its quest for the main contract?
Some companies, particularly those that specialize in engineering,
will want some guarantee of reimbursement for all or part of their
expense regardless of the success of the group. However, all pro-
posal and precontract expenses are usually for the separate ac-
count of each member. (2) If one of the members of the group de-
cides to drop out because it cannot accept the price or terms of the
main contract, will it have any obligation to reimburse any of the
other members for the expenses they incurred in pursuing the pro-
ject? Presumably, any member who wishes to drop out of the
group should be free to do so without penalty of any kind. Forcing
it to pay part of the precontract expenses of the other members is
a coercive device which leads to decisions to accept contracts that
it would otherwise not enter. A provision might be drafted obliging
a withdrawing member to pay expenses of the other members up
to an agreed upon amount, with the knowledge that such a limited
liability provision might find a greater degree of acceptance. Good
commercial relations demand that such a provision be discussed at
the very beginning of the consortium's relations, rather than raised
after negotiations with the customer have commenced. Absent such
1980]
140 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM [Vol. 3:121
a provision, each cash member should be free to make its own
"bid-no bid" decision without penalty. (3) In the event of delays
caused by the fault of one or more of the members, will those
members reimburse the other members for the extra costs incurred
by them as a result of the delay? Many companies that willingly ac-
cept all or a portion of the liability of the customer, feel that the
added costs of the other members are in the nature of consequen-
tial damages which are either unacceptable or acceptable within
certain narrowly defined limits.
While there is a good argument that a delaying member
should be responsible to his fellows for their added expenses, the
proper solution calls for a limit to be placed on this exposure. Each
member can add to its contingency pricing a reasonable amount to
cover possible delays by other members. To make another totally
liable in an attempt to protect against this contingency is to ask for
endless argument and, ultimately, some form of litigation. (4) Who
is to bear the costs incurred after completion of the project?
Unanticipated delays in obtaining provisional acceptance of the
project may cause additional costs to the construction company fur-
nishing the facilities for the technical advisors. While in theory
such costs should be for the account of the customer, in practice it
is almost impossible to obtain reimbursement for such expenses.
It seems that the costs incurred after completion should be
borne by all the members, not just those directly obligated to ab-
sorb them, in proportion to their respective percentages of the en-
tire project, on the theory that all should suffer for delay or default
of the buyer.
CONCLUSION
A consortium is a contractual association between business en-
tities which does not presume any fiduciary relationship. The heart
of the contractual association is the consortium agreement. This
document embodies the relationship between the consortium
members, and therefore should be drafted carefully. Clarity and
specificity in the consortium agreement hopefully will prevent the
imposition of duties and liabilities on the consortium members that
were never intended or anticipated.
